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Abstract 
 
 
This paper argues that emergentism is not committed to downward causation but of direct causation. 
Events that are believed to be caused by a mental state, whether physical or mental, are actually caused 
by a physical state with a mental property. These mental properties are caused by the complexity of a 
collection of several physical components. Emergentism, as a view, is often faced by the fallacy of 
composition given its nomological nature which leads one to resort to dualism. Mental properties cannot 
exist in and of itself, but it only supports the physical through entailment. Lastly, it gives a brief 
discussion regarding some of the conditions of the possibility of emergent properties in conjunction with 
the characteristics of biological organisms. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, I will argue for the reconsideration of emergentism to hopefully 
contribute in answering the mind-body problem. First, I will focus on the idea that the 
conception of causality in emergentism is not committed to downward causation like 
previously thought. Downward causation is a criterion for substance dualism. 
Substance dualism is the idea that there are two distinct properties, the physical brain 
and the mind. Though I argue that emergentism can be considered distinct from the 
traditional monism or physicalism, having one substance, it differs as the emergence of 
a property allows for a new quasi-substance seeing emergentism as a type of anomalous 
monism1 (Davidson 1970). In this paper, I am not suggesting emergentism debunks 
supervenience causation, but rather clarify the misconception about downward 
                                                          
1 Anomalous monism is a type of property dualism which denies that the mind and the 
body are two distinct substances. The relationship of these two properties is that one is 
contingent to the other.  
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causation2 as an objection to the emergentist view. Instead, I am using supervenient 
causation to explore the emergentist view further (Kim 1984). 
 
To give a brief overview, emergentism is a perspective originating from the philosophy 
of art, wherein a new property emerges once it attains a high level of complexity 
(O’Connor & Wong 2015).3 Supervenience, on the other hand, explains that complex 
properties supervene from lower level properties (McLauglin & Bennett 2014).4 The 
distinction between the two are quite ambiguous, but I do think that supervenience can 
only be understood through retrospection, thus showing direct causality. Emergence, on 
the other hand, shows as to what process different higher levels are achieved. 
Supervenience, in its earlier usage by the British Emergentist Lloyd Morgan, “used the 
term ‘supervene’ to characterize a relation that emergent properties bear to their base 
properties” (M&B, 2014). Additionally, Kim used C. D. Broad’s definition of a new 
epiphenomenalism to explain his supervenience theory of causation. He claims that this 
new epiphenomenalism allows for mental causation given that mental causation 
supervenes an underlying physical state (1984). This becomes more puzzling as 
emergentism’s peak of popularity was when Broad had written about his piece during 
the early 20th century (O&W 2015). This paper will try to highlight what emergentism 
is, and attempt to distinguish it from epiphenomenalism and supervenience, and 
illustrate how causation works. 
 
Causation 
 
The success of science provides a threat to understanding the mind and especially 
consciousness. Given the arguments for qualia, the physicalist view does not seem 
plausible. Adhering to dualism provides a bad connotation due to its affinity with souls 
and God, which compromises Ockham’s Razor by multiplying entities needlessly given 
physicalism. Emergentism tries to link the two through nomological causality.5 Thus, I 
do agree with some of the dualists argue about consciousness being a fundamental 
property. I also do agree with the existence of quale or subjective experience 
(Shoemaker 1975). Keith Campbell asserted there is no denying consciousness making 
central state materialism and its claims to have solved the mind-body problem (1984). 
However, central state materialism or identity theory denies qualia and that all is 
strictly physical. Epiphenomenal dualism also does not seem like a plausible view, as it 
denies mentally caused events (Searle 1998). In this paper, I will address the causality 
in more detail. 
                                                          
2 Jagwon Kim’s argument against emergentism as a viable view is that he thought it 
asserts downward causation. 
3 For the sake of shortening, I will use O&W to cite their entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
4 I will use M&B to cite their entry in the SEP 
5 At least for now, there are events that we could not determine what the actual causes 
are. In biology, for example, the origins of life is still a puzzle. 
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To better understand emergentism, the classical example of water is provided. The 
chemical formula for water is H2O and remains the same for water vapor, liquid, and 
ice. However, the arrangement of H2O molecules results in the property of water being 
a liquid, solid, or gas. Searle wrote: 
 
An emergent property of a system is one that is causally explained by the 
behavior of the elements of a system; but it is not a property of an individual 
elements and it cannot be explained simply as a summation of the properties of 
those elements (1997). 
 
This provides more value given that water as a liquid also obtains other characteristics 
such as wetness or being a solvent. Thus, the emergent property increases the 
capabilities of water through its properties. 
 
Assume then that H2O in its plain molecular state, in the absence of other emergent 
properties, can cause an effect on other molecules. For example, sulfide (SO3) 
combined with H2O can give us sulfuric acid (H2SO4). Using this analogy relating to 
the mind, we can visualize the reflexive mechanism of pain. When one touches a very 
hot pan, one tends to retract his arms back even before pain was even realized6 as a 
mental state. To put it into terms, P causes P*, where P is a physical event and P* as a 
new physical event. The physical stimulus stays within the physical without the need 
for any mental event. With the absence of a mental state, pain cannot be pain7 for pain 
is essentially subjective and is only realized. The problem with this is when an 
individual is in coma or paralyzed and no longer have these types of reflexes. If there is 
a damaged nerve on top of the site and depending on the severity, the person no longer 
feels the pain. If one sees it without feeling it, they can conclude that it is painful and 
probably know that it is painful. This is due to the causal analysis of mental concepts: 
cause has certain effects and effects have certain causes; but effects can only be 
achieved if the necessary conditions are met (Armstrong, 1977). We only know that it 
is painful, even if we do not feel the pain (other minds) because we have receptors that 
can relate the event by induction to previous experiences through using other sense-
perceptual faculty or faculties.8 In this case, the necessary conditions were the 
interconnectedness of the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous system 
should be somewhat intact. 
 
                                                          
6 Realization Strategy: Mental properties are realized by physical properties, and mental 
properties are causally relevant if their realizing base properties are causally relevant. 
7 This pain is more of a matter of ontology where pain is something that causes a change 
in behavior and intentionality. The first pain is used as a word in physiology. 
8 Sense of sight, for example, allows another person to observe pain hence creating a 
quasi-experience of that pain. The perception coming from the sense of sight is being 
related by the person to conception. 
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Now, let us explore causation with these emergent properties given our example, water. 
H2O cannot bind with salt (NaCl) the same way the previous example of SO3 can to 
produce H2SO4. It is (partially) achievable
9, however, if H2O possesses an emergent 
property (liquidity) with a trait of being a solvent. The salt can be easily dissolved in 
water and the water takes another trait of being “salty”. Thus, we can see that the 
emergent property allows for causations that cannot be explained if all explanations are 
reduced to physical explanations. It needed the property to dissolve salt and that causes 
another effect both in the water and in the salt. The brain is far more complex 
substance, however, but I believe that this is what is occurring. Capacity for qualia is 
another characteristic of the brain, which emerges through its complexity of both 
composition and behavior. To put this into more explicit terms, M (mental state) 
emerged from P, thus M is caused by P, and M allows for P to cause for a specific P* to 
occur given emergentism. M caused P*, as M is a necessary condition for P to cause P*. 
P in conjunction with the effect M allows for P*, where M* (a new mental state) 
emerges from P*. M* is not directly caused by P in conjunction with an M, for M* can 
only be an effect that emerges from P*. 
 
Differentiating this with Kim’s supervenience is the most difficult task, for causation in 
supervenience is almost the same, or must I say that it is the same. Kim’s thesis about 
emergentism’s downward causation M causing P* and M’s relationship with M* as 
epiphenomenal is false. There are series of events that happen which make this 
different. It is the value of M for P* to occur and the connection between M and M*. In 
Kim’s supervenient causation, he illustrates that there is some indirect causation 
between M and M* given that M* supervenes P* (1984). In this kind of causation, M 
does not have any indirect causation nor relation to M*. I could not say that M had 
caused M*, but what I could say is that P, which entails M, had indirectly caused M* 
by directly causing P*. M* has a relationship to P* through direct causality. The type of 
causation can be explained the same way as that of type identity theory, as essentially, P 
causes a series of P’s, except that P has an entailment of M as a property given its 
complexity. 
 
Downward Causation and Dualism 
 
To further the discussion about downward causation, it is important to understand that 
by adopting emergentism, the emergent property does not become a separate substance 
from where it emerges. The mental state does not necessarily imply a higher level 
event, but the mental state is just a property. The mental state is not a different 
substance than that of the physical state. Adhering to downward causation would make 
emergentism a dualist view. This is not the case. H2O remains water regardless of 
whether it has the property of liquidity. It is not just the mental working to cause an 
                                                          
9 Salt binding with water is not through electron sharing. 
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event, but that mental is just a property, and together with the physical, causes another 
physical event. 
 
Emergent properties can change together with the lower properties. An artwork10 for 
example, may not be as beautiful if some of its physical components are altered. 
Something as simple as the lighting and position of the artwork can change whether it 
remains beautiful. There is a connection between the property and the lower levels that 
cause it. If a higher level property is altered, then rest assured the lower level property 
will be altered as well. However, changes in the lower level do not determine change in 
higher levels. For example, it is understood that an ion exchange occurs through the 
sodium-potassium pump during muscle movement, but causality cannot be determined 
just from knowing about the occurrence of ion exchange. We cannot ascertain the 
muscles are going to work just by this information. 
 
Some information can be predicted with high probability. The physical brain might 
change a person’s mood when induced with psychotropic medications. The physical 
events, like visual experience, for example, are transposed into the mental by the 
organization of impulses between the synapses. There are qualia that were all emerging 
from the arrangement and behavior of the brain. This claim can be more thoroughly 
supported by electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). The experiences of people who had 
undergone ECT changed. During ECT, tonic-clonic seizures and drooling occurred in 
these people. The mental did not cause the whole set of events, but the alteration of 
behavior of electrical impulses in the brain had triggered the alteration of both physical 
and mental components. Another example is a person with Alzheimer’s disease. The 
memory’s degradation which is framed as mental by the dualist is, in fact, an effect of 
an alteration of the brain state. With a person with Alzheimer’s disease, the alteration of 
the brain state is related to a decrease in the acetylcholine levels in the brain. It is 
without a doubt that the mind and body are causally related, but not of two different 
things. 
 
Emergentism is not compatible with dualism. Given the characteristics and traits of 
emergentism, I argue that it is pluralistic rather than dualistic. Emergent properties are 
consistent with higher order theories of consciousness (HOT). Emergentism allows for 
a kind of stratification of consciousness (Kim 1992). The more complex a system is, 
more higher states can emerge from it. If we consider each level of this stratification, 
then we are allowing not just monistic or dualistic, but a pluralistic view of 
consciousness. HOT occurs when a conscious thought is consciously acknowledged 
from a pool of other conscious thoughts. It postulates that some types of thought require 
higher levels of consciousness, like thinking, as to perceiving something through the 
senses (qualia) do not need this kind of higher level (Rosenthal 1986). However, I do 
                                                          
10 Since the term originated in the philosophy of art, it is the same phenomenon in the 
philosophy of mind except with subtle differences that will be explained later. 
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not require this kind of pluralistic idea of consciousness given that these types of 
thought can still be quasi reducible to the physical. It will just be P entails M which 
entails MH where MH is a higher order thought. 
 
According to Antonio Damasio, human consciousness is distributed by three parts, the 
medulla oblongata, the cerebral cortex, and the thalamus, all communicating with each 
other to create the current human consciousness (2010). This is also relatable to 
Freudian psychoanalysis encompassing the id, ego, and superego. The complexity of 
the consciousness is directly linked to the physical. Through evolution and looking at 
the composition of other vertebrates, we can see how the formulation of a higher level 
of consciousness might have emerged. Thus, HOT is a plausible theory given 
emergentism. If we look into our peripheral nervous system towards the central nervous 
system, we can see how such a theory would work. The reflexes, for example, are the 
simplest organization of a sensing to acting loop. The reflexes are more primordial. The 
medulla oblongata responds to the autonomic nervous system. Breathing, for example, 
is controlled by the medulla. However, we can consciously not breathe. These are 
higher levels of causation, situations where conscious choice affects our central nervous 
system. Therefore, given this stratification of the mental and its relation to the physical, 
it might be concluded that it is pluralistic. But for reasons that I will mention later, it 
remains an anomalous monistic view. 
 
The Characteristics of Biological Organisms 
 
One might argue that emergentism posits more problems than it solves. On the face of 
it, the view itself is perhaps absurd and advocates some type of magic to explain the 
occurrence (or emergence) of new properties. It is indeed due to my claim of direct 
causation between the body and its property, the mind, that I am compelled to give 
importance that the existence of the mind is nomological11 and without any strict laws 
explained in metaphysics (Davidson 1970). It is easier to understand that if the lower 
level properties are manipulated, then those of the higher projects some type of effect 
(Woodward 2003). However, if the cause is altered, then a desired effect is expected. 
This might be due to three reasons. First, there are criteria that causality requires that 
needs to be satisfied before an effect occurs (Armstrong 1977). Second, there is the 
problem of induction (Vickers 2016). Lastly, neurons have different biological traits 
and characteristics which make them more complex (Damasio 2010, Godfrey-Smith 
2016). In the proceeding paragraphs of this essay, I will try to clear up the absurdity of 
emergentism by attempting to deconstruct the nomological aspect to give it more 
validity. 
 
                                                          
11 Further explanation of how we can relate the nomological into what we actually 
know will be discussed later in this essay. 
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Causality as a requirement can be explained through the action-potential mechanism in 
biology: the all or nothing law. A threshold needs to have sufficient action-potential to 
satisfy a necessary condition for the occurrence of an effect. Different neurotransmitters 
facilitate this process of inhibition and exhibition and it all happens within the synaptic 
cleft. An earlier example, a complete spinal cord lesion, would not have any action-
potential reaching the brain, so in this case the pain is not felt. Another example is a 
person whose pain tolerance is higher than others; they would not report the same 
sensation. However, like previously mentioned, we know that the actions are painful 
(conception, analogy). A complete opposite of this, for example, is a person being 
tortured and shown a blow torch that is to be used on his back. A popsicle is switched 
and the person felt pain from anticipating that it will burn one’s back. The thresholds 
for pain fluctuates due to mentally-caused events.12 
 
Hume introduced us the problem of induction. A causes B if and only if were A to 
occur, we would anticipate B will also happen. This problem is not something that I 
will dwell on much in this essay, but it is worth pointing out that previous events do not 
ascertain the events that will follow, especially in complex structures. 
 
Biological processes are complex, but biology is important to understanding causation. 
From the above problems of causal requirements and induction, understanding biology 
can help us understand the underlying causal processes. By laying out some of the 
inherent traits of the physical brain and its components, it will show that there is much 
to know about the brain. Biological processes are sometimes randomized. Natural 
selection is a process of selecting favorable traits; for if traits help individuals to 
survive, then they are selected for. Natural selection, however, would not occur without 
randomized mutations. The next step from homeostasis is that the environment changes 
and kills off those that which could not survive. After that step, next is to mutate and 
favor those whose mutations are adaptive to the environment. Another random event in 
these biological processes is observed in heredity. Sometimes, recessive traits appear 
even if there is a significant chance for dominant traits. Even if both parents have 
brown eyes, but because they have recessive alleles for blue eyes, there is a chance that 
their offspring will have blue eyes. The effects given causation cannot just simply be 
determined. 
 
Maybe consciousness is fundamental since the emergence of life. The levels of 
complexity of consciousness vary depending on how they have evolved through time. 
When differentiating a unicellular organism to a multicellular, we can see that the 
functions of the unicellular are now distributed to specific group of cells. The 
multicellular becomes highly complex and each cell drops their primitive functions13 
                                                          
12 Mentally-caused will be used from here on out as P entails M. 
13 A unicellular organism’s apparatus or organ for excretion, eating, digestion, and 
motility are all in one cell. 
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and "specializes”14 in a particular function. It is similar to a phenomenon observed in a 
society. An individual is capable of focusing on art or developing other skills given that 
other individuals would specialize in food production. The societal functions are carried 
out by individuals working together. Modern agriculture allows for these 
"specializations" to occur. The organization of individuals can now be said to have 
reached a certain level of complexity where society emerges from individuals. As we 
can see, the property of being a society is only attained through the behavior among 
individuals, but it is not the totality of individuals (population) nor the individuals 
themselves that defines what a society is. Like the relationship of the mind and the 
body, the society is the behavior of individuals within the population. Consciousness is 
just a teleological trait of human life and a product of the complexity achieved by 
multicellularity. 
 
Another biological characteristic of neurons is that they are plastic. When neurons are 
damaged, other neurons are capable of taking the role of these other neurons. A person 
with hemispherectomy, for example, can still be fully functional regardless of having 
half the brain removed. This can support the case for dualism, but I will argue that it is 
not so. Biological organisms are highly adaptive and neuroplasticity is just another 
example of the brain’s trait in order to keep itself functional. It is just as important as 
other types of asexual reproduction (liver repair, blood production, etc.) that occurs 
intraorganism and sexual reproduction that occurs interorganism. The emergent 
property of the mind is more related to the behavior of the parts (continuous neural 
activity) than the number of neurons involved. To better understand this principle, 
imagine The China Brain by Ned Block (1978). Except here, I will use it to show that 
the arrangement does not matter but the relationships and behavior of the components 
do. Supposed a massive earthquake affects the population of China drastically. Their 
population is cut in half. The Chinese people, however, are resilient and their 
nationalism increased. Because of this, the Chinese people are able to boost their 
economy in better ways than in the past. Thus, The China Brain survived and is capable 
of maintaining their previous state, if not better. Due to this biological trait, I argue that 
emergentism is consistent with functionalism. Multiple realizability can occur as the 
neurons can adapt the specialization of other neurons, thus, pain does not solely occur 
at one origin or location. The China Brain is a mind in itself given its complexity.15 
Collective consciousness is a good example of how our minds extend, not just to 
physical objects, but to other minds as well. An individual is a far more complex 
structure than a neuron and is of a higher state than a single neuron. A group of 
                                                          
14 Specializations happen when the functions of one cell becomes distributed to multiple 
cells carrying one function per each cell. 
15 Collective consciousness is a type of consciousness in itself. It is just a lot more 
different for the amount of autonomy of individuals are different than that of neurons. 
Res Cogitans (2017) 8                                                                                                                 Lota | 38 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
neurons, however, can attain consciousness separate from its actual, thus, “double 
consciousness” may occur, like that of a split-brain.16 
 
Conclusion 
 
Emergentism, as a view, might be able to describe the phenomenon of the mind and 
consciousness. It does not commit to downward causation like previously thought, but 
rather closer to supervenient causation. The difference is that only physical states can 
cause both physical and mental events, given it entails a mental property. Dualism 
resorts to the easier explanation of things and evades the harder questions. The harder 
question is not just in the search for what causes consciousness or why is there 
consciousness, I think that those can easily be answered by our current understanding of 
science. The harder question is how emergent properties occur from reaching higher 
complex structures and that would require further research. 
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